Aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics, banking, and finance, this is a core textbook for the financial markets, institutions, and regulation option of courses in financial economics. It integrates modern theories of asymmetric information into the analysis of financial institutions, relating the theory to current developments. The text begins with an analysis of adverse selection in retail financial products like life assurance before looking at open capital markets where trades and prices provide information. It then progresses to the more complex areas of corporate governance and financial intermediation in which information is confidential and moral hazard and verification problems become important. These chapters study the various mechanisms that the financial markets have developed to allow investors to delegate the management of their assets to others. This analysis is used to show how regulation can reduce the risk of financial failure and how legal, accounting, and regulatory mechanisms can help shape a country's corporate and financial architecture. These difficult theoretical concepts are conveyed through the careful use of numerical illustrations and topical case studies. Each chapter ends with a set of exercises to test and reinforce students' comprehension of the material. Worked solutions are provided for the numerical exercises.

About the Author
Peter D. Spencer is Professor of Financial Economics at Birkbeck College, London and Economic Adviser to the Ernst & Young ITEM Forecasting Club. He started his career at HM Treasury and spent ten years working in the City of London, most recently as Chief Economist of Dresdner Kleinwort Benson. He is chairman of the Shadow Monetary Policy Committee and Assured Property Management plc.

Reviews
Financial textbook analyzes financial products from the perspective of information theory; explains why financial markets and institutions are prone to failure; and addresses how regulation can reduce the risk of failure and how legal and regulatory constraints help shape a country's corporate and financial structures. Discusses asymmetric information in financial markets; adverse selection in the market for retail financial services; the structure and regulation of insurance markets; capital-market microstructure and regulation; information revelation, transparency, and insider regulation; security research and regulation; the equity market and managerial efficiency; the theory of financial intermediation; moral hazard in the bank loan and public bond markets, excessive risk, and bank regulation; bank runs, systemic risk, and deposit insurance; bank regulation in practice; and financial structure and regulation. Includes end-of-chapter exercises. * Journal of Economic Literature esFinancial textb *



Book Information
ISBN 9780198776109
Author Peter D. Spencer
Format Paperback
Page Count 284
Imprint Oxford University Press
Publisher Oxford University Press
Weight(grams) 411g
Dimensions(mm) 235mm * 156mm * 15mm