This is the first full-length study in English of the career of one of France's most controversial military leaders, General Maurice Gamelin (1872-1958). Gamelin was reviled by many of his contemporaries and denigrated by historians as 'the man who lost the Battle of France'. Here Gamelin is re-appraised in the context of the unstable civil-military relations and national decline of the years 1933-40. Basing his account on hitherto inaccessible primary sources and on public and private archives. The evidence reviewed, including Gamelin's private headquarters' diary, provides the basis for a revision of the earlier hostile portraits of the general. The author argues that less attention should be paid to the campaign in France in 1940, by which time Gamelin's role was that of co-ordinator and adviser. Rather, he suggests that great credit is due to Gamelin for his success in holding together the pre-war civil-military consensus, and for re-arming France by 1939.

The first full-length study in English of 'the man who lost the Battle of France'.
Reviews
' ... immensely thorough, dispassionate and well written ... This impressive volume, developing the themes of previous revisionist interpretations, throws new light on pre-1939 French politics and strategy and shows that Gamelin deserves considerable credit for the degree of preparedness and civil-military co-operation that was achieved.' The Times Literary Supplement
'Martin has set himself the difficult task of salvaging Gamelin's reputation, and he marshals vast scholarship and admirable clarity of exposition to that end, making a major contribution to the grim history of appeasement and rearmament.' The Observer
'Martin Alexander's book will long be a landmark in the political and military history of the 1930s.' European History Quarterly



Book Information
ISBN 9780521372343
Author Martin S. Alexander
Format Hardback
Page Count 588
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 1030g
Dimensions(mm) 229mm * 152mm * 37mm