This book argues that the meaning of negation, perhaps the most important logical constant, cannot be defined within the framework of the most comprehensive theory of proof-theoretic semantics, as formulated in the influential work of Michael Dummett and Dag Prawitz. Nils Kurbis examines three approaches that have attempted to solve the problem - defining negation in terms of metaphysical incompatibility; treating negation as an undefinable primitive; and defining negation in terms of a speech act of denial - and concludes that they cannot adequately do so. He argues that whereas proof-theoretic semantics usually only appeals to a notion of truth, it also needs to appeal to a notion of falsity, and proposes a system of natural deduction in which both are incorporated. Offering new perspectives on negation, denial and falsity, his book will be important for readers working on logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of language.

Provides an original analysis of negation - a central concept of logic - and how to define its meaning in proof-theoretic semantics.

About the Author
Nils Kurbis is a research fellow in the Department of Philosophy at University College London. He has published articles in the Journal of Philosophical Logic, Logique et Analyse and Grazer Philosophische Studien.

Reviews
'... a valuable addition to the proof-theoretic semantics literature and definitely worth reading.' Ivo Pezlar, Studia Logica



Book Information
ISBN 9781108481304
Author Nils Kurbis
Format Hardback
Page Count 316
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 720g
Dimensions(mm) 254mm * 178mm * 21mm