The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.

About the Author
James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. From spring 2015-2017, he served as chair of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association. He is the author of five previous books, including Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama, The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq, and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11.

Reviews
Planning to Fail breaks new ground in the study of US grand strategy and military performance. Instead of asking why the United States chose to fight in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Lebovic focuses on how different administrations waged each war and how haphazard strategic planning made it impossible to achieve their aims. His accounts of these long and unsuccessful campaigns are rich, detailed, and convincing, and the book contains many important lessons for leaders hoping to avoid their predecessors mistakes. * Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School *
In this path-breaking study, Lebovic explains how the policy milieu in Washington produced similar patterns in the course and conduct of US intervention in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Officials responded to proximate goals in each of these conflicts, never devising a grand strategy that could capitalize on success or reduce the possibility of failure. Planning to Fail offers critical insight into the limits of the policy process when it comes to avoiding the perils of intervention. * James J. Wirtz, Dean of School of International Graduate Studies and Professor, Naval Postgraduate School *
It has always been a great puzzle of American politics why US policymakers, who are normally skeptical of nation-building and other ambitious schemes of social engineering at home, regularly are overly optimistic about it abroad, especially when they can do it using the US military. Lebovic offers a troubling but compelling explanation for the political myopia that has plagued recent US decisions to go to war from Vietnam through Iraq. We can only hope that after reading his book, future policymakers will take the long, long look before they leap into complex military operations. * Michael C. Desch, Packey J. Dee Professor of International Affairs and Founding Director of the Notre Dame International Security Center *



Book Information
ISBN 9780190935320
Author James H. Lebovic
Format Hardback
Page Count 258
Imprint Oxford University Press Inc
Publisher Oxford University Press Inc
Weight(grams) 499g
Dimensions(mm) 236mm * 163mm * 28mm