Order within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield.

Order within Anarchy examines treaty law, focusing on international law, laws of war and how effective such limitations truly are.

About the Author
James D. Morrow is A. F. K. Organski Collegiate Professor of World Politics and Research Professor at the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. He previously taught at the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Stanford University, the University of Rochester and Michigan State University. He is the author of Game Theory for Political Scientists, co-author of The Logic of Political Survival, and author of more than sixty articles in refereed journals and other publications. He was president of the Peace Science Society (International) in 2008-9. Morrow received the Karl Deutsch Award from the International Studies Association in 1994 and has been a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution and an Advanced Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies for the Social Science Research Council.

Reviews
'Inspired by game theory, Order within Anarchy persuasively argues that international law restrains violence on the battlefield by fostering mutual expectations. Cutting across lines of cleavage in international relations theory, and using a full panoply of research methods, Morrow shows in compelling fashion when and how law can be effective in regulating self-interested behavior, even under the most challenging conditions.' David A. Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego
'James Morrow uses game theory to show that the laws of war enable states to align their expectations about the use of violence during war, and he tests his theory with an exhaustive data set. Order within Anarchy is the best theoretical and empirical analysis of a body of international law that I have read. It holds important lessons for what states can accomplish practically through international law.' Eric Posner, Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School
'Morrow brings much needed rigor to the difficult topic of the laws of war. For all the time and effort that has been spent attempting to reduce the horrors of war, we understand very little about why, how, and when legal rules move us toward that goal. Order within Anarchy is just what the field needs. Its empirical results are built on a rock-solid theoretical foundation which not only offers answers the critical questions about the laws of war, but delivers the tools needed for future scholars to continue the inquiry. The book is a must-read for both political scientists and legal scholars interested in the laws of war.' Andrew Guzman, Jackson H. Ralston Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley Law School



Book Information
ISBN 9781107626775
Author James D. Morrow
Format Paperback
Page Count 368
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 510g
Dimensions(mm) 227mm * 152mm * 19mm