Description
Supporting sound logic with extensive data, the author offers a comparative analysis of oversight activities of intelligence with other policy areas to show that Congress is not overseeing nearly as much in intelligence as in other policy domains. Electoral incentives, she reveals, explain why. Zegart also identifies two key institutional weaknesses: one, the rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the development of legislative expertise in intelligence and, two, committee jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress's budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. She concludes that, unfortunately, electoral incentives on the outside and the zero-sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities.
About the Author
Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and an affiliated faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. She has been featured in the National Journal as one of the ten most influential experts in intelligence reform.
Book Information
ISBN 9780817912840
Author Amy B. Zegart
Format Hardback
Page Count 144
Imprint Hoover Institution Press,U.S.
Publisher Hoover Institution Press,U.S.
Weight(grams) 333g