This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.

About the Author
Lisa L. Martin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Harvard University.

Reviews
"As Martin acknowledges at the end of her fine scholarly book--a sophisticated conceptual approach matched to a well-articulated argument--more study needs to be given to the actual politics and to the psychology of international sanctions."--Alan K. Henrickson, Harvard International Review "A major theoretical and substantive contribution to the study of international cooperation and the imposition of economic sanctions."--Choice "A major theoretical and substantive contribution to the study of international cooperation and the imposition of economic sanctions."--Choice



Book Information
ISBN 9780691034768
Author Lisa L. Martin
Format Paperback
Page Count 324
Imprint Princeton University Press
Publisher Princeton University Press
Weight(grams) 454g