The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book. It uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points, and includes detailed proofs given as explanations for the models. The text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course.

Key Features * Uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points * Detailed proofs are given as explanations for the models * Text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course
Reviews
"This is a well written book on an important topic. Everyone should run out and buy a copy." --GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR "Osborne and Rubenstein's authoritative book represents a landmark in the evolution of bargaining theory. Future research in the field will undoubtedly take the ideas presented in this book as a starting point. Accordingly, it should be read and digested by anyone with a serious interest in formal models of the bargaining process." --CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS



Book Information
ISBN 9780125286329
Author Martin J. Osborne
Format Hardback
Page Count 236
Imprint Academic Press Inc
Publisher Emerald Publishing Limited
Weight(grams) 519g
Dimensions(mm) 229mm * 152mm * 17mm