Description
This book addresses two questions - why some political systems have more centralized systems of interpersonal redistribution than others, and why some political unions make larger efforts to equalize resources among their constituent units than others. This book presents a new theory of the origin of fiscal structures in systems with several levels of government. The argument points to two major factors to account for the variation in redistribution: the interplay between economic geography and political representation on the one hand, and the scope of interregional economic externalities on the other. To test the empirical implications derived from the argument, the book relies on in-depth studies of the choice of fiscal structures in unions as diverse as the European Union, Canada and the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression; Germany before and after Reunification; and Spain after the transition to democracy.
This is a book about redistribution and inequality in political unions.
About the Author
Pablo Beramendi is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University. His research focuses on the political economy of redistribution and inequality. Previously, he has taught at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and at the Department of Politics at the University of Oxford. He is also a research associate at the Juan March Institute (Madrid) and a former research Fellow at the Science Center (Berlin). Among his published work are articles on the determinants of taxation and inequality; the role of inequality in shaping electoral turnout; and the relationship between federalism, inequality, and redistribution.
Reviews
"Across the world, federations and quasi-federations come in all shapes and sizes. Their welfare and redistributive consequences are also strikingly different. In this terrific, sophisticated, agenda-setting book, Pablo Beramendi explains why. The Political Geography of Inequality is a must-read." Carles Boix, Princeton University
"By integrating the study of inequality with the study of federalism this ambitious book casts new light on both. The theoretical synthesis Beramendi proposes helps explain such diverse phenomena as why some countries and regions are better able to respond to economic shocks, why some countries can sustain higher levels of redistribution and equality, and why it is so difficult for currency unions like the Eurozone to succeed. The book is a remarkable achievement that will have a major impact on the field of comparative political economy for years to come." Torben Iversen, Harvard University
"The design of fiscal unions is a topic of central importance not only in Europe but in all countries with some degree of local autonomy. In a methodologically sophisticated analysis, Beramendi destroys several stereotypes according to which local autonomy must be associated with a high degree of individual inequality. This is an eye-opening contribution." Adam Przeworski, New York University
Awards
Winner of Best Book Award, European Politics and Society Section, American Political Science Association 2013. Short-listed for Luebbert Best Book Award, Comparative Politics Section, American Political Science Association 2014.
Book Information
ISBN 9781107008137
Author Pablo Beramendi
Format Hardback
Page Count 320
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 590g
Dimensions(mm) 240mm * 163mm * 25mm
This is a book about redistribution and inequality in political unions.
About the Author
Pablo Beramendi is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University. His research focuses on the political economy of redistribution and inequality. Previously, he has taught at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and at the Department of Politics at the University of Oxford. He is also a research associate at the Juan March Institute (Madrid) and a former research Fellow at the Science Center (Berlin). Among his published work are articles on the determinants of taxation and inequality; the role of inequality in shaping electoral turnout; and the relationship between federalism, inequality, and redistribution.
Reviews
"Across the world, federations and quasi-federations come in all shapes and sizes. Their welfare and redistributive consequences are also strikingly different. In this terrific, sophisticated, agenda-setting book, Pablo Beramendi explains why. The Political Geography of Inequality is a must-read." Carles Boix, Princeton University
"By integrating the study of inequality with the study of federalism this ambitious book casts new light on both. The theoretical synthesis Beramendi proposes helps explain such diverse phenomena as why some countries and regions are better able to respond to economic shocks, why some countries can sustain higher levels of redistribution and equality, and why it is so difficult for currency unions like the Eurozone to succeed. The book is a remarkable achievement that will have a major impact on the field of comparative political economy for years to come." Torben Iversen, Harvard University
"The design of fiscal unions is a topic of central importance not only in Europe but in all countries with some degree of local autonomy. In a methodologically sophisticated analysis, Beramendi destroys several stereotypes according to which local autonomy must be associated with a high degree of individual inequality. This is an eye-opening contribution." Adam Przeworski, New York University
Awards
Winner of Best Book Award, European Politics and Society Section, American Political Science Association 2013. Short-listed for Luebbert Best Book Award, Comparative Politics Section, American Political Science Association 2014.
Book Information
ISBN 9781107008137
Author Pablo Beramendi
Format Hardback
Page Count 320
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 590g
Dimensions(mm) 240mm * 163mm * 25mm
