This book analyzes Palestinian attempts to create an organized military force from the period of the Mandate up to the present day. Beginning with a comparative overview of the relationship between insurgent movements and the quest to build up a standard military, the book looks, first, at how the 1936 revolt galvanized the Palestinian leadership to attempt to create a military. It then goes on to examines other major topics such as: the 1948 failure to create an organized armed force; Palestinian participation in other Arab armed forces; the creation of the PLA; attempts to develop a security apparatus after Oslo; and, finally, the question of security reform and peace-making. The book concludes by identifying the lessons from the Palestinian experience that can be applied in promoting healthy civil-military relations within political entities located in major conflict zones.

Book Information
ISBN 9780415609425
Author Hillel Frisch
Format Paperback
Page Count 232
Imprint Routledge
Publisher Taylor & Francis Ltd
Weight(grams) 163g