Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.
Reviews
Terence Cuneo, someone already identified by those who have been paying attention as a young moral philosopher to watch, has written a splendid book...an important and engaging contribution to the metaethical literature. * James Lenman, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
The Normative Web is an important book, if for no other reason than it does something that is unfortunately all too rare in contemporary metaethics: it presents a very promising argument in favour of moral realism. * Daniel Star, Mind *


Awards
Winner of Awarded an Honourable Mention for the American Philosophical Association Book Prize 2009.



Book Information
ISBN 9780199218837
Author Terence Cuneo
Format Hardback
Page Count 272
Imprint Oxford University Press
Publisher Oxford University Press
Weight(grams) 1g
Dimensions(mm) 240mm * 160mm * 20mm