Originally published in 1973. In this systematic treatise, Anthony Quinton examines the concept of substance, a philosophical refinement of the everyday notion of a thing. Four distinct, but not unconnected, problems about substance are identified: what accounts for the individuality of a thing; what confers identity on a thing; what is the relation between a thing and its appearances; and what kind of thing is fundamental, in the sense that its existence is logically independent of that of any other kind of thing? In Part 1, the first two problems are discussed, while in Part 2, the third and fourth are considered. Part 3 examines four kinds of thing that have been commonly held to be in some way non-material: abstract entities; the un-observable entities of scientific theory; minds and their states; and, finally, values. The author argues that theoretical entities and mental states are, in fact, material. He gives a linguistic account of universals and necessary truths and advances a naturalistic theory of value.

Reviews

Reviews of the original publication:

"The book's scope is large and the detail impressive. It is a considerable work of twentieth-century metaphysics." The Times Literary Supplement

"Quinton has written an admirable book. Its arguments and expositions are firm, clear and well-ordered; its scope it wide; it is written with vigour and lucidity; and it has a unifying objective." New Statesman

Book Information
ISBN 9780367194086
Author Anthony M. Quinton
Format Paperback
Page Count 402
Imprint Routledge
Publisher Taylor & Francis Ltd
Weight(grams) 453g