Do institutions matter in economic theory? Or is the economic analysis of institutions a distraction from the most important action? Indeed, does Vernon Smith's notion of the "institution-free core" of formal economic theory encompass that most important action? To explore this question, this book opens with an informal tour of the economics of system design out of which an economics of adaptation ultimately emerged. Here the author takes up an approach that is more agnostic, inter-disciplinary, and even a little irreverent. What can theory do and not do? Theory can stimulate questions about how parties manage competing demands for commitment and flexibility in their relationships, but what blind spots persist? The book opens with an informal tour of the economics of system design out of which an economics of adaptation ultimately emerged. The book then offers explorations, via the application of the economics of adaptation in both law and economics relating to how parties manage relationships within the firm, within the context of long-term contracts, and, most vividly, within the context of antitrust conspiracy.

Book Information
ISBN 9781849800372
Author Dean V. Williamson
Format Hardback
Page Count 304
Imprint Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Publisher Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd