This engrossing and meticulously researched volume reexamines the decisions made by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in the crucial months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. In late August 1944 defeat of the Wehrmacht seemed assured. On December 16, however, the Germans counterattacked. Received wisdom says that Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy caused his armies to stall in early September, and his subsequent failure to concentrate his forces brought about deadlock and opened the way for the German attack. Arguing to the contrary, John A. Adams demonstrates that Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF had a good campaign strategy, refined to reflect developments on the ground, which had an excellent chance of destroying the Germans west of the Rhine.

A provocative reassessment of Allied strategy in World War II

About the Author

John A. Adams is author of If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War (IUP, 2008).

Reviews

Adams' great achievement is including the necessary level of detail to support analysis of a broad spectrum of historical events without boring the reader. Scholars have already examined many of the topics Adams addresses, but they have seldom drawn them together in a coherent evaluation of operational challenges as Adams has.

* Military Review *



Book Information
ISBN 9780253354358
Author John A. Adams
Format Hardback
Page Count 392
Imprint Indiana University Press
Publisher Indiana University Press
Weight(grams) 726g