Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers the following answer: whatever else they may represent, conscious mental states always represent themselves (whereas unconscious ones do not, at least not in the right way). The book develops this 'self-representational' approach to consciousness along several dimensions - including phenomenological, ontological, and scientific - and defends it from common and uncommon criticisms.

About the Author
Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, and Associate Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies, at the University of Arizona. He has published numerous articles on the nature of consciousness and related topics.

Reviews
Review from previous edition Kriegel's aim is to provide a comprehensive theory of phenomenal consciousness ... it combines an impressive attention to the empirical side of the matter with a genuinely philosophical treatment ... There are new ideas and arguments in every section. * Joseph Levine, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *



Book Information
ISBN 9780199694709
Author Uriah Kriegel
Format Paperback
Page Count 340
Imprint Oxford University Press
Publisher Oxford University Press
Weight(grams) 522g
Dimensions(mm) 235mm * 156mm * 18mm