Description
About the Author
Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His interests cover a range of topics, including the evolution of conventions, the social contract, inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation, the metaphysics of logical atomism, causality, and truth. He is the author of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (OUP, 2010) and From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity. Coherence, and Induction (OUP, 2012).
Reviews
The book collects important contributions of a leading scientist in evolutionary game theory and drives us to study correlation devices further as possible solutions for the problems of human cooperation and of the social contract with analytical and simulation tools. * Karoly Takacs, Corvinus University of Budapest, Journal of Artificial Societies *
It is rewarding and exemplifies a good way of doing formal philosophy. It sheds light on what evolutionary approaches, especially simulations, can and cannot do for philosophy. But mostly, it highlights the fact that our understanding of social phenomena cannot be complete if we neglect a dynamical point of view ... We may not need only books like this in philosophy; but we need some, and we certainly need more of them. And if the recent literature is any indication, we will have them -- in no small part due to Skyrms' remarkable, pioneering work * Cedric Paternotte, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
Social Dynamics offers a careful, informed exploration of the relevant ones, as well as discussions of their explanatory import. No one interested in the evolution of sociality should ignore it, if only to know what it takes to carry out a thorough evolutionary investigation. * Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online *
Book Information
ISBN 9780199652839
Author Brian Skyrms
Format Paperback
Page Count 368
Imprint Oxford University Press
Publisher Oxford University Press
Weight(grams) 450g
Dimensions(mm) 215mm * 141mm * 21mm