A common theme of airpower histories is that the Combined Bomber Offensive was the proving ground for a post-war independent air force. Whether or not the United States Strategic Air Forces (USAAF) could perform to the hype of its interwar doctrine, Allied commanders based their rival approaches to victory in Europe on their differing views of independent airpower. However, there is an essential, yet overlooked facet to this story: commanders' convictions alone could not hold sway within the War Department, much less at the politically and bureaucratically charged meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The air commanders pressed their staffs for decision-quality assessments and photographic evidence to sell their arguments and project their progress. They needed informed targeting plans and objective post-raid reports as well as an air-intelligence enterprise to mature all-too-quickly out of interwar neglect. What they received--and Brian Vlaun explains--was a collision of organizational interests and leadership personalities that shaped Ira Eaker's command of the Eighth Air Force in 1943, the tumultuous air campaign over Germany, and the path of the post-war U.S. Air Force.

As a result of the author's research through thousands of declassified files, Selling Schweinfurt examines the relationships between air-intelligence organizations and key decision-makers. His analysis spans from pre-war planning and doctrine development, through the Eighth Air Force's independent air campaign, and culminates with the formation of the United States Strategic Air Forces and its 1944 pre-invasion preparations. This book concludes that military organizations, if left unchecked, may adopt symbols and exaggerate claims to justify their own preferences and market their ideas in ways that mask their optimistic assumptions. In the case of the air campaign against Germany, both the four-engine bomber and specialized targets--like Schweinfurt's ball bearings--served as symbols and powerful marketing tools for the AAF and air intelligence, respectively.

About the Author
Brian D. Vlaun is a colonel and command pilot in the United States Air Force. His military experience ranges from the tactical through strategic levels, including duties as Commander of the B-1B Formal Training Unit, airpower strategist in USAF Headquarters, and Vice Commander of a nuclear bomber wing. He holds a PhD in Military Strategy from the USAF's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

Reviews
A superb, engrossing study of the evolution of US air intelligence and airpower from the interwar years to early 1944, Vlaun's Selling Schweinfurt is a welcome and much-needed addition to the literature not only on strategic bombing and World War II, but also airpower and the US Air Force." -Paul D. Gelpi, Professor of Military History, Marine Corps University

"Vlaun's sophisticated examination of the effect exerted by personal biases and organizational behaviors on airmen like Ira Eaker and Carl Spaatz, as well as on intelligence personnel themselves and their combat assessments, makes this required reading for military historians, contemporary military planners, and joint force commanders as well." -Mark J. Conversino, author of Fighting With Soviets: The Failure of Operation Frantic, 1944-1945; Chief Academic Officer, Air University

"If 'air power is targeting,' then Brian D. Vlaun's is on-time and on-target. By deftly weaving together air intelligence, targeting, assessment and the individuals working behind the scenes, Vlaun updates the familiar story of the bombing campaigns of World War II and does the nearly impossible: adds something new to our understanding of that conflict. Comprehensively researched, wisely crafted, and above all well-argued." -Brian D. Laslie, author of Architect of Air Power: General Laurence S. Kuter and the Birth of the U.S. Air Force



Book Information
ISBN 9781682475362
Author Brain Vlaun
Format Hardback
Page Count 320
Imprint Naval Institute Press
Publisher Naval Institute Press
Weight(grams) 650g
Dimensions(mm) 231mm * 160mm * 27mm