Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense are they defective? Many will be false and harmful, but philosophers have further argued that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by violating our epistemic responsibilities. It is also assumed that we are only morally responsible for the harms that prejudiced beliefs cause because, in forming these beliefs in the first place, we are violating our epistemic responsibilities. In Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that these common convictions are misguided. His discussion shows in detail that there are many epistemically justified pathways to prejudiced belief, and that it is a mistake to lean on the concept of epistemic responsibility to articulate our ethical responsibilities. Doing so unreasonably burdens victims of prejudice with having to show that their victimizers were in a position to know better. Accordingly, Begby provides an account of moral responsibility for harm which does not depend on finding grounds for epistemic blame. This view is supported by a number of examples and case studies at individual, collective, and institutional levels of decision making. Additionally, Begby develops a systematic platform for "non-ideal epistemology" which would apply to a wide range of other social and epistemic phenomena of current concern, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, science scepticism, and more.

About the Author
Endre Begby received his MA degree from the University of Oslo and his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. He is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Simon Fraser University. His areas of specialization include epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, as well as social and political philosophy.

Reviews
... this book provides lucid and thought-provoking descriptions of how people may acquire prejudiced beliefs in fraught socio epistemological environments. * Katherine Puddifoot, Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, England, Metascience *
The author's prose is clear, and he works through a great deal of difficult material in short compass. Philosophers, policymakers, and students will all profit from reading this book. * B. T. Hutchinson, CHOICE *
This is a well-written and thought-provoking book. It is both philosophically sophisticated and relatively accessible. Advanced students with some background in relevant areas should have no trouble following the broad outline of the argument. Researchers interested in the topics it covers (and it covers quite a few) will gain a lot from reading it. Some of them will find things to disagree with, but that is only to be expected. All told, this is a sophisticated and nuanced account of the epistemology and ethics of prejudice and prejudiced belief. * Robin McKenna, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
...this is what makes Begby's work so informative and such a landmark in non-ideal epistemology * Guy Lancaster, Marx & Philosophy Review of Books *
And this is what makes Begby's work so informative and such a landmark in non-ideal epistemology, for by demonstrating how prejudice accords with our normal cognitive operations, it centers the humanity of all involved, even those perpetrators of so much so-called "inhumanity." * Guy Lancaster, Marx & Philosophy Review of Books *
This book provides lucid and thought provoking descriptions of how people may acquire prejudiced beliefs in fraught socio-epistemological environments. * Katherine Puddifoot, Metascience *
The book does an excellent job motivating inquiry into what a system of epistemic norms for agents with our specific cognitive and situational limitations would look like. * Renee Jorgensen, Ethics *



Book Information
ISBN 9780198852834
Author Endre Begby
Format Hardback
Page Count 240
Imprint Oxford University Press
Publisher Oxford University Press
Weight(grams) 414g
Dimensions(mm) 221mm * 144mm * 20mm