Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's diagnostic categories. The main argument defended by Tsou is that genuine mental disorders are biological kinds with harmful effects. This argument opposes the dogma that mental disorders are necessarily diseases (or pathological conditions) that result from biological dysfunction. Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of psychiatric categories.

Against the dogma that mental disorders are diseases, this Element argues that mental disorders are biological kinds with harmful effects.
Reviews
'Tsou's deep fluency with philosophy of science will make his contribution particularly useful for philosophers familiar with central themes in that field, such as natural kinds, realism, and causation, who want to learn about the application of these themes in a medical context. ... a nice introduction for newcomers to philosophy of science who are motivated to learn about philosophy of science through their interest in the challenges facing contemporary psychiatry.' Kathryn Tabb, Metascience



Book Information
ISBN 9781108706667
Author Jonathan Y. Tsou
Format Paperback
Page Count 75
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 130g
Dimensions(mm) 228mm * 150mm * 5mm