Description
A comprehensive theory of the causes of nuclear proliferation, alongside an in-depth analysis of sixteen historical cases of nuclear development.
About the Author
Alexandre Debs (PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Connecticut, where he is also co-Director of the Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy. His work centers on international security and applied game theory. Specifically, it investigates the causes of war, nuclear proliferation, and democratization, and has appeared in such journals as the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Security, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. Debs received a Rhodes scholarship in 2000 and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, California in 2011-12. Nuno P. Monteiro (PhD, University of Chicago, 2009) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Connecticut, where he is also Director of Research of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy. His work centers on international relations theory and security studies, specifically great-power politics, power transitions, nuclear studies, the causes of war, deterrence theory, military occupations, and the philosophy of science. He is the author of Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge, 2014) as well as articles published in International Organization, International Security, International Theory, and Perspectives on Politics, among other venues.
Reviews
'This impressive book is a model of judicious scholarship and a landmark in the study of nuclear proliferation. Focusing on the strategic interactions between would-be proliferators, their adversaries, and their allies, Debs and Monteiro present a simple and powerful theory explaining why some states seek the bomb while others choose to forego it. The logic of their argument is straightforward and the evidence they present is compelling. No one interested in strategy, security, or the role of nuclear weapons can afford to ignore this work.' Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Massachusetts
'Nuclear Politics is an important book. Debs and Monteiro show that the spread of nuclear weapons is best understood as a three-way strategic interaction between a government contemplating getting the bomb, its adversaries considering how best to stop such acquisition, and its allies calculating whether to coerce or threaten to abandon the ally, to offer renewed security assurances, or to acquiesce in its nuclear proliferation. The authors combine stunningly clear analytic logic with rich historical case studies to produce a major work of social science that should be read by political scientists, historians, and policymakers.' Scott Sagan, Caroline S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University, California
'Nuclear Politics marks an important step forward in our understanding of nuclear proliferation. Focusing explicitly on the strategic interaction between the potential proliferator and its allies and adversaries, the book accounts for patterns of proliferation that no other approach has been able to explain. We see for example why even though nuclear weapons are often described as the 'weapons of the weak', weak states that also lack cover from a great power are unlikely to develop nuclear weapons and, indeed, historically never have.' Robert L. Powell, Robson Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
'Nuclear Politics significantly advances our understanding of nuclear proliferation by applying a penetrating analytic lens to this critical topic. Debs and Monteiro develop a theory of strategic interaction between the potential proliferator, its adversaries and its allies. Their theory integrates existing insights about the causes of proliferation, demonstrating how they are related to and intertwined with each other; and it gives new prominence to underappreciated features of the potential proliferator's strategic environment, including the possibility that preventive attacks convince states not to acquire nuclear weapons. The book provides impressive empirical support for its theoretical insights.' Charles L. Glaser, Director, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
'Why have we seen surprisingly few nations obtain the bomb since Hiroshima? Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro provide the most powerful answer to this question yet. Blending painstaking empirical research with a robust theoretical architecture, they show that the major nuclear powers, above all the US, have long deployed ruthless - and effective - policies of nonproliferation, not out of some selfless idealism but because states with bombs threaten their preponderance. The strategic conditions established by these policies, Debs and Monteiro demonstrate, make it relatively uncommon for a nation to be both willing and able to go for the bomb. This elegantly written book provides both authoritative scholarly analysis and a clear blueprint for future US nonproliferation efforts.' Campbell Craig, Cardiff University, and co-author of America's Cold War
Book Information
ISBN 9781107518575
Author Alexandre Debs
Format Paperback
Page Count 648
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 910g
Dimensions(mm) 228mm * 152mm * 35mm