Description
Busch explores how our understanding of nuclear proliferation centers on theoretical disagreements about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. His study bridges the gap between theory and empirical evidence by determining whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of various systems of nuclear weapons regulation, Busch projects what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ and assesses the threat posed by the possible theft of fissile materials by aspiring nuclear states or by terrorists.
No End in Sight provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of issues at the forefront of contemporary international affairs. With the resurgence of the threat of nuclear terrorism, Busch's insights and conclusions will prove critical to understanding the implications of nuclear proliferation.
Book Information
ISBN 9780813123233
Author Nathan E. Busch
Format Hardback
Page Count 512
Imprint The University Press of Kentucky
Publisher The University Press of Kentucky