Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.

About the Author
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy, Dartmouth College

Reviews
Sinnott-Armstrong's aim is to determine whether, how, and to what extent our moral beliefs can be justified. His discussion of these issues is remarkably clear, thorough, and solid... Given its philosophical rigor and insight and the import of the issues it deals with, I highly recommend this book not solely to those interested in moral epistemology but to anyone concerned with epistemology in general. * Diego E. Muchuca, Philosophy in Review *



Book Information
ISBN 9780195342062
Author Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Format Paperback
Page Count 288
Imprint Oxford University Press Inc
Publisher Oxford University Press Inc
Weight(grams) 417g
Dimensions(mm) 232mm * 160mm * 17mm