Are moral values objective or are they relative to different cultural contexts and traditions? Do values have any place in a 'disenchanted' scientific conception of the world and, if so, how do human beings relate to such values culturally, psychologically, and epistemologically? This book examines contemporary responses to these questions.

Moral Realism introduces students to contemporary debates concerning moral realism, including issues related to ethical naturalism, moral epistemology, moral motivation, cultural pluralism and moral disagreement. In the context of examining and connecting these different debates, the book presents its own unique form of moral realism according to which values may be belief-independent while also being characterized by an ontological pluralism that generates incommensurable moral disagreements and 'tragic' dilemmas. This idea serves as a guiding thread and also represents an attractive and neglected metaethical position in its own right. Specific attention is devoted to locating debates about moral realism in actual, embodied contexts, by looking to issues in experimental moral psychology, cross-cultiural anthropology and political science, permitting an accessible approach ideal for undergraduate students.

An accessible and original overview of contemporary debates in moral realism and relativism.

About the Author
Kevin DeLapp is Harold E. Fleming Chair of Philosophy at Converse College, USA.

Reviews
A welcome contribution to the moral realism literature. DeLapp presents a compelling account of the central disputes surrounding moral realism in an admirably clear book. Experts will find much of interest; those new to the subject will find an overview of the issues at stake, as well as a compelling case for why these issues matter. -- J. Jeremy Wisnewski, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Hartwick College, USA
A thorough and philosophically sophisticated analysis of moral realism and its alternatives. This book is an extraordinarily clear and highly valuable guide for both students and professional philosophers. DeLapp's defense of moral realism is imaginative and astute. -- Ellen Suckiel, Professor Emerita of Philosophy at University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
This is an accessible and lively introduction to philosophical arguments for and against moral realism. DeLapp manages to stay connected with the broad concerns of the educated public while presenting an interesting case for his own version of moral realism that ethical theorists must address. -- David B. Wong, Professor of Philosophy at Duke University, USA
Kevin DeLapp is a natural teacher who mounts a comprehensive argument to show that a strong form of moral realism is not crazy, possibly credible. DeLapp's tactic is offensive, not defensive, trying to establish that moral realism can be made sense of inside a naturalistic philosophical framework that takes moral psychology, evolutionary biology, and anthropology seriously.Moral Realism is the force to be reckoned with by us anti-realists who wanted to hear the moral realist's best arguments. -- Owen Flanagan, James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy at Duke University, USA
This book is more than a good and useful introduction to arguments for and against moral realism. DeLapp offers a plausible and supportable realistic conception. I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to become familiar with contemporary metaethical issues and the ways in which they can be solved while maintaining a robust moral realism as a lively option. -- Laszlo Kocsis, University of Pecs, Hungary * Metapsychology *



Book Information
ISBN 9781441126917
Author Professor Kevin DeLapp
Format Hardback
Page Count 208
Imprint Bloomsbury Academic USA
Publisher Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Weight(grams) 394g