Islamist militants based in Pakistan have played a major role in terrorism around the world and pose a significant threat to regional and international security. Although the Pakistan-militant connection has received widespread attention only in recent years, it is not a new phenomenon. Pakistan has, since its inception in the wake of World War II, used Islamist militants to wage jihad in order to compensate for severe political and material weakness. This use of militancy has become so important that it is now a central component of Pakistani grand strategy; supporting jihad is one of the principal means by which the Pakistani state seeks to produce security for itself. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the strategy has not been wholly disastrous. It has achieved important domestic and international successes, enabling Pakistan to confront stronger adversaries and shape its strategic environment without the costs and risks of direct combat, and to help promote internal cohesion to compensate for its weak domestic political foundations. Recently, however, these successes of Pakistan's militant strategy have given way to serious problems. The militant organizations that Pakistan nurtured over the decades are increasingly exceeding its control; continued support for jihad diverts scarce resources from pressing domestic projects, impeding the country's internal development; and the militant campaign's repeated provocations have led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture. As Paul Kapur shows in Jihad as Grand Strategy, these developments significantly undermine Pakistani interests, threatening to leave it less politically cohesive and externally secure than it was before. Thus, despite its past benefits, the strategy has outlived its utility, and Pakistan will have to abandon it in order to avoid catastrophe. This will require not simply a change of policy, but a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the Pakistani state.

About the Author
SG: Professor of Political Science, Indiana University PK: Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

Reviews
Paul Kapur offers a blunt, informed, and pessimistic assessment of Pakistan's manipulative relationship with violent jihadist militants. He argues convincingly that support for violent non-state actors is a central component of a long-standing Pakistani grand strategy that has become counter-productive. His incisive analysis concludes that Pakistan risks catastrophe if its militant strategy is not abandoned. * Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University *
This book is a major addition to the growing literature on Pakistan and its turbulent trajectory, succinctly written in easy-to-read prose. It is one of the rare works that focuses exclusively on the jihadist strategy of the Pakistani elite and its consequences. It adds substantively to our understanding of a somewhat unusual path Pakistan has undertaken to fight its larger enemy India and its consequences for the state and society as well as the international and regional security orders. * T.V. Paul, McGill University *
Jihad as Grand Strategy is not only a profound and comprehensive study of Pakistan's 69-year old strategy of using jihad as an instrument of defense, but also the first one. It is not possible to understand modern global jihad without understanding Pakistan's jihad strategy, which is the source of modern jihad. * Arif Jamal, author of Call for Transnational Jihad and Shadow War *



Book Information
ISBN 9780199768523
Author S. Paul Kapur
Format Hardback
Page Count 184
Imprint Oxford University Press Inc
Publisher Oxford University Press Inc
Weight(grams) 386g
Dimensions(mm) 155mm * 236mm * 18mm