Description
As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
This book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
About the Author
Jonathan Rodden is the Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT, and was recently a visiting scholar at the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University, his B.A. from the University of Michigan, and was a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Leipzig. In collaboration with the World Bank, he recently co-edited a book entitled Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (MIT Press 2003). His articles have appeared in journals including The American Journal of Political Science, The British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Organization, The Virginia Law Review, and World Politics.
Reviews
"This timely book takes on a crucial topic for scholars and practitioners-especially in newly democratizing societies that are walking the potentially dangerous and complex road towards decentralization. It departs from what was becoming conventional wisdom, and develops a more critical and agnostic approach to federalism and decentralization than its predecessors. Roddenas arguments emerge from comparative politics, game theory, and modern macroeconomics, and his empirical approach combines subtlety and breadth by mixing quantitative and qualitative analyses, ranging from cross-country regressions to rich treatments of complex historical cases.(continued underneath)
Especially appealing is the fact that his country specialization is thematic and comparative rather than regional. Hamilton's Paradox will become a must-read for economists, political scientists, and other analysis interested in federalism, fiscal policy, and institutional development more generally, and it sets the agenda for future research in the field." Mariano Tommasi, Universidad de San Andres
"This is a landmark book on fiscal federalism and one that will be influential both in policy circles and in the academy for many years to come." Mark Hallerberg, Emory University
Awards
Winner of Gregory Luebbert Award - Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association 2007.
Book Information
ISBN 9780521842693
Author Jonathan A. Rodden
Format Hardback
Page Count 334
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 558g
Dimensions(mm) 235mm * 157mm * 24mm
This book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
About the Author
Jonathan Rodden is the Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT, and was recently a visiting scholar at the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University, his B.A. from the University of Michigan, and was a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Leipzig. In collaboration with the World Bank, he recently co-edited a book entitled Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (MIT Press 2003). His articles have appeared in journals including The American Journal of Political Science, The British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Organization, The Virginia Law Review, and World Politics.
Reviews
"This timely book takes on a crucial topic for scholars and practitioners-especially in newly democratizing societies that are walking the potentially dangerous and complex road towards decentralization. It departs from what was becoming conventional wisdom, and develops a more critical and agnostic approach to federalism and decentralization than its predecessors. Roddenas arguments emerge from comparative politics, game theory, and modern macroeconomics, and his empirical approach combines subtlety and breadth by mixing quantitative and qualitative analyses, ranging from cross-country regressions to rich treatments of complex historical cases.(continued underneath)
Especially appealing is the fact that his country specialization is thematic and comparative rather than regional. Hamilton's Paradox will become a must-read for economists, political scientists, and other analysis interested in federalism, fiscal policy, and institutional development more generally, and it sets the agenda for future research in the field." Mariano Tommasi, Universidad de San Andres
"This is a landmark book on fiscal federalism and one that will be influential both in policy circles and in the academy for many years to come." Mark Hallerberg, Emory University
Awards
Winner of Gregory Luebbert Award - Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association 2007.
Book Information
ISBN 9780521842693
Author Jonathan A. Rodden
Format Hardback
Page Count 334
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 558g
Dimensions(mm) 235mm * 157mm * 24mm
