Description
Chander shows that a game-theoretic approach, which offers insight into the nature of interactions between sovereign countries behaving strategically and the kinds of outcomes such interactions produce, can illuminate how best to achieve international agreements in support of climate-change mitigation strategies. Game Theory and Climate Change develops a conceptual framework with which to analyze climate change as a strategic or dynamic game, bringing together cooperative and noncooperative game theory and providing practical analyses of international negotiations. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and argues that the Paris Agreement may succeed where the Kyoto Protocol failed. Finally, Chander discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates, including a global agreement to support development of cleaner technologies on a global scale.
About the Author
Parkash Chander is professor of economics and executive director of the Center for Environmental Economics and Climate Change at the Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, O. P. Jindal Global University. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and was formerly head of the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, and of the Department of Economics at the National University of Singapore.
Reviews
Written exceptionally clearly, this book lays out a novel theory of cooperative games and coalition formation as it applies to environmental problems-and in the process makes significant progress in reconciling cooperative and noncooperative game theory. -- Benjamin Ho, Vassar College
Climate change is an extraordinarily challenging problem, partly because of its global commons nature. For this reason, game theory can bring valuable insights to considerations of alternative public policies, as well as to international negotiations among the countries of the world. In Game Theory and Climate Change, Parkash Chander adds in significant ways to the relevant scholarly literature at the interface of climate change, economics, and game theory. -- Robert N. Stavins, Harvard University
In this important and timely book, Chander, a leading environmental economist and game theorist, systematically develops a set of game-theoretic solutions to the grand challenge of global climate change. He convincingly demonstrates the value of integrating insights from both cooperative and noncooperative games, and the importance of side payments in improving international climate agreements. He advances important solution concepts such as subgame perfect agreements and incorporates important real-world features, such as heterogeneity across nations. I strongly recommend the book to researchers as well as practitioners interested in international climate negotiations. -- Jinhua Zhao, Michigan State University
The book will interest PhD students and game-theory experts. Recommended. * Choice *
This is a timely book, interpreting climate change negotiations in terms of game theory
concepts. The content of the book is based on a stream of papers published by the
author over more than 20 years. The book is aimed at economists who use finely crafted
mathematical models to explore possible solutions to complex social and environmental
problems. The extensive bibliography will be helpful to any newcomer in the field
of environmental economics. -- Alain B. Haurie * MathSciNet *
Work like Chander's is important precisely because it creates tools we can use to imagine the distance between our world and one in which powerful actors have committed to a response to climate change. * H-Environment *
Book Information
ISBN 9780231184649
Author Parkash Chander
Format Hardback
Page Count 344
Imprint Columbia University Press
Publisher Columbia University Press