Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as a basic method of philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and, Jackson suggests, widely misunderstood; he argues that there is nothing especially mysterious about it and a whole range of important questions cannot be productively addressed without it. He anchors his argument in discussion of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion and change, to the philosophy of colour and to ethics. The significance of different kinds of supervenience theses, Kripke and Putnam's work in the philosophy of modality and language, and the role of intuitions about possible cases receive detailed attention. Jackson concludes with a defence of a version of analytical descriptivism in ethics. In this way the book not only offers a methodological programme for philosophy, but also throws fascinating new light on some much-debated problems and their interrelations.
Reviews
This book is the published version of Jackson's 1995 John Locke Lectures. It is an outstanding work. Given its breath and originality, it deserves to be widely studied. Given its brevity and clarity, it actually might be. The book covers a vast range of topics, from the issue of physicalism in the philosophy of mind, via the nature of conceptual analysis, to the metaphysics of colour and ethics. In each area Jackson stakes out a distinctive position which accords with the basic account of metaphysics defended throughout. * Hallvard Lillehammer, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science *



Book Information
ISBN 9780198250616
Author Frank Jackson
Format Paperback
Page Count 188
Imprint Oxford University Press
Publisher Oxford University Press
Weight(grams) 240g
Dimensions(mm) 217mm * 138mm * 11mm