In a world dependent on the constant sharing of information, central bankers increasingly communicate their policies to the mass public. Central bank communications are drafted in monetary policy committee meetings composed of policymakers with differing interests. Despite their differences, committee members must come together, write, and agree to an official policy statement. Once released to the public, central bank communications then affect citizens' actions and ultimately, the economy. But how exactly does this work? In Crafting Consensus, Nicole Baerg explains how the transparency of central bank communication depends on the configuration of committee members' preferences. Baerg argues that monetary policy committees composed of members with differing preferences over inflation are better suited to communicating precise information with the public. These diverse committees produce central bank statements of higher quality and less uncertainty than those from more homogeneous committees. Additionally, she argues that higher quality statements more effectively shape individuals' inflation expectations and move the economy in ways that policymakers intend. Baerg demonstrates that central bankers are not impartial technocrats and that their preferences and the institutional rules where they work matter for understanding the politics of monetary policy and variations in economic performance over time. Conducting empirical analysis from historical archival data, textual analysis, machine-learning, survey experiments, and cross-sectional time-series data, Crafting Consensus offers a new theory of committee decision making and a battery of empirical tests to provide a rich understanding of modern-day central banking.

About the Author
Nicole Baerg is Assistant Professor in Government and co-director of the Essex Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis at the University of Essex. She worked previously as a research intern at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her research interests include comparative political institutions, central banking, political economy, quantitative text analysis, and European integration.

Reviews
Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates. Graduate students, faculty, and professionals. * M. H. Lesser, Lenoir Rhyne University, CHOICE *
Considers the language central bankers use to guide the economy, highlighting the role of central banking institutions and committees in determining the level of vagueness in official policy communications. * Journal of Economic Literature (Volume 59, no. 1) *



Book Information
ISBN 9780190499488
Author Nicole Baerg
Format Hardback
Page Count 224
Imprint Oxford University Press Inc
Publisher Oxford University Press Inc
Weight(grams) 386g
Dimensions(mm) 137mm * 211mm * 23mm