Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.

Financial crises put pressure on constitutional orders, inviting exceptional responses that vary in effectiveness, and have an impact long afterwards.

About the Author
Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Law School. Mark D. Rosen is University Distinguished Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. Georg Vanberg is Professor of Political Science and Law, and current Chair of the Department of Political Science at Duke University, North Carolina.

Reviews
'... this work is an excellent academic account for researchers ... this volume is well described as a showcase for an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.' Elizabeth Robson Taylor, Phillip Taylor, The Barrister



Book Information
ISBN 9781108729208
Author Tom Ginsburg
Format Paperback
Page Count 342
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 462g
Dimensions(mm) 229mm * 152mm * 18mm