Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. In the past, most philosophers have ignored the topic, vaguely supposing that conspiracy theories are obviously irrational and that they can be easily dismissed. The current philosophical interest in the subject results from a realisation that this is not so. Some philosophers have taken up the challenge of identifying and explaining the flaws of conspiracy theories. Other philosophers have argued that conspiracy theories do not deserve their bad reputation, and that conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. This book represents both sides of this important debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history. It represents a significant contribution to the growing interdisciplinary debate about conspiracy theories.

About the Author
David Coady is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Tasmania, Australia

Reviews

"This is an important contribution to a neglected area of applied, public epistemology. The essays, along with Coady's useful introduction, clearly set out the critical shortcomings of conspiracy theories via central epistemological concepts like evidence, warrant, and testability. But authors also uncover rich layers of complexity beneath our everyday talk, and in performing that philosophical task, they expose shortcomings of any attempt at simple dismissal of conspiracy theories. Coady has selected essays that display a surprising and attractive balance." -- Jonathan Adler, City University of New York

"The book offers some useful definitions of both conspiracy and conspiracy theory." -- Scientific and Medical Network

Book Information
ISBN 9781138247918
Author David Coady
Format Paperback
Page Count 184
Imprint Routledge
Publisher Taylor & Francis Ltd
Weight(grams) 340g