Postwar American officials desired - in principle - to promote Arab-Israeli peace in order to stabilize the Middle East. Yet Peter L. Hahn shows how, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, that desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S. leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between Israel and its neighbors. U.S. leaders were unable to relinquish responsibilities that became increasingly difficult to fulfill, and they were unable to resolve a dispute that would continue to generate instability for years to come.

About the Author
Peter L. Hahn is associate professor of history at The Ohio State University and executive director of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. He is author of The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War.

Reviews
"A very thorough and at times eye-opening account of America's early efforts to address all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the factors that influenced its successes and failures.... Future academic assessments of this period will have to grapple with Hahn's account." - Middle East Journal"



Book Information
ISBN 9780807857007
Author Peter L. Hahn
Format Paperback
Page Count 416
Imprint The University of North Carolina Press
Publisher The University of North Carolina Press
Weight(grams) 600g