Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.

This book uses formal models to explore the conditions under which nuclear agreements are credible.

About the Author
William Spaniel is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He previously served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is also the author of Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook (2011).

Reviews
'... this book is another useful contribution to the extensive literature on nuclear proliferation.' J. Fields, Choice



Book Information
ISBN 9781108701846
Author William Spaniel
Format Paperback
Page Count 224
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Weight(grams) 350g
Dimensions(mm) 227mm * 151mm * 14mm