Dodd explains that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation between true thought and fact is identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true; they are merely true thoughts. The resulting modest identity theory allows for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.

About the Author
JULIAN DODD lectures in philosophy at the University of Manchester, UK. His previous publications include Musical Works: An Essay in Ontology (OUP, 2007) and, with Helen Beebee, Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate (OUP, 2005).

Reviews
'Dodd's book presents a clear, thorough account of work on identity theories of truth...Dodd's clear, thorough exposition of the issues, and his engagement with minimalism, rewards close study.' - Michael Hay, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 'Exceptionally clearly argued...this is an excellent book...Dodd has thought-provoking things to say about the work of Ramsay, Tarski, Blackburn, Prior, Vendler, Rundle, and Salmon...The book is so well written that it could serve as a partisan introduction to truth for postgraduates and advanced undergraduates. Indeed, it could serve as a model of how to write good, clear philosophical prose. Overall, the book can profitably be read by anyone interested in the philosophy of truth.' - Alexander Miller, Mind



Book Information
ISBN 9780230573710
Author Julian Dodd
Format Paperback
Page Count 200
Imprint Palgrave Macmillan
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan