Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits decline. Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests that the military take a less-is-more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy-handed approach that is typical of most comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts-especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

While many have made superficial comparisons between the Iraq and Vietnam wars, Lebovic takes this task more seriously than most. His analysis yields important lessons by placing both wars in a more comprehensive context. -- Christopher F. Gelpi, Duke University

About the Author
James H. Lebovic is a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University. He is the author of Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: U.S. National Security Policy after 9/11; Foregone Conclusions: U.S. Weapons Acquisition in the Post-Cold War Transition; and Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy.

Reviews
This is an excellent study. -- Robert Jervis Perspectives on Politics 2010 Recommended. Choice 2011 Lebovic undertakes a thoughtful and detailed study of the Vietnam War and extracts the similarities and lessons from the experience for the United States' recent role in Iraq. -- Robert J. Lieber H-Diplo 2011



Book Information
ISBN 9780801894725
Author James H. Lebovic
Format Hardback
Page Count 312
Imprint Johns Hopkins University Press
Publisher Johns Hopkins University Press
Weight(grams) 567g
Dimensions(mm) 229mm * 152mm * 25mm