Fear pervades dictatorial regimes. Citizens fear leaders, the regime's agents fear superiors, and leaders fear the masses. The ubiquity of fear in such regimes gives rise to the "dictator's dilemma," where autocrats do not know the level of opposition they face and cannot effectively neutralize domestic threats to their rule. The dilemma has led scholars to believe that autocracies are likely to be short-lived. Yet, some autocracies have found ways to mitigate the dictator's dilemma. As Martin K. Dimitrov shows in Dictatorship and Information, substantial variability exists in the survival of nondemocratic regimes, with single-party polities having the longest average duration. Offering a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, Dimitrov argues that single-party autocracies have fostered channels that allow for the confidential vertical transmission of information, while also solving the problems associated with distorted information. To explain how this all works, Dimitrov focuses on communist regimes, which have the longest average lifespan among single-party autocracies and have developed the most sophisticated information-gathering institutions. Communist regimes face a variety of threats, but the main one is the masses. Dimitrov therefore examines the origins, evolution, and internal logic of the information-collection ecosystem established by communist states to monitor popular dissent. Drawing from a rich base of evidence across multiple communist regimes and nearly 100 interviews, Dimitrov reshapes our understanding of how autocrats learn--or fail to learn--about the societies they rule, and how they maintain--or lose--power.

About the Author
Martin K. Dimitrov is Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. His books include Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China; Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe; and The Political Logic of Socialist Consumption.

Reviews
In this rigorous and innovative study, Dimitrov sheds new light on the inner workings of authoritarian regimes and on the difficulties faced by these governments to collect and systematize information about the workings of their societies. Deploying a wealth of novel archival evidence, Dimitrov documents tremendous variation in the institutions established by authoritarian regimes to gather such information. Dictatorship and Information is a must-read for all students of authoritarian regimes. * Isabela Mares, Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science, Yale University *
Can authoritarian leaders reliably gauge the level of support for their regime? If they can resolve this 'dictator's dilemma,' can they act on the information effectively? Drawing on a wealth of internal documents from the Communist party-states of China and Bulgaria, Dimitrov answers (a surprising albeit qualified) 'yes' to both questions, thereby making a major contribution to our understanding of the foundations of authoritarian resilience. * Elizabeth J. Perry, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University *
Many of us have theorized and postulated about the deployment of secret police by authoritarian regimes to stay in power, but Dimitrov plumbs the depths of the archives and documents of secret police organizations in several countries and uncovers some startling new insights. This is a path-breaking work that is at once relevant to contemporary development in China and Russia, as well as a major empirical contribution to the literature that will keep scholars of authoritarian regimes busy for years to come. * Victor Shih, Associate Professor of Political Economy and Ho Miu Lam Chair in China and Pacific Relations, University of California San Diego *
No dictatorship can escape the paradox of repression: the more brutal the regime is, the less certain can it be about its own genuine popularity and forestall incipient opposition. In this masterful analysis, Martin Dimitrov documents how autocrats from Cold War-era communist Eastern Europe to present-day China have confronted this paradox. * Milan Svolik, Professor of Political Science, Yale University *
Centralized autocracies that suppress open political expression employ a range of substitute channels of information about the actual dispositions of citizens. This information can be deployed either to focus repression or respond to potential sources of popular discontent. In recent years analysts have become more attentive to the ways that these mechanisms serve to stabilize autocratic rule. In his innovative comparative analysis of surveillance and monitoring in China, Bulgaria, and a range of other autocracies, Dimitrov sharpens and clarifies our understanding of why and how these efforts succeed or fail to make autocracies more flexible and resilient. * Andrew G. Walder, author of Agents of Disorder: Inside China's Cultural Revolution *
Abundantly supported by internal documents from the communist parties and governments of Bulgaria and China,...Dictatorship and Information provides a thorough treatment of communist rule in Bulgaria. * Choice *
The use of a variety of sources is certainly unique in the field of research the book relates to. * Maxim Goecke *



Book Information
ISBN 9780197672938
Author Martin K. Dimitrov
Format Paperback
Page Count 496
Imprint Oxford University Press Inc
Publisher Oxford University Press Inc
Weight(grams) 662g
Dimensions(mm) 156mm * 236mm * 33mm